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NOTES AND COMMENTS
ther, I see no reason why our courts would not follow the broad
approach of the Restatement of Trusts and of the New York courts.
There is no basis for a contentious approach.
Assuming that the North Carolina courts accept the Totten
trust, the lawyer is faced with the problem of draftsmanship for
the deposit. A simple deposit reading "John Doe in trust for
Richard Roe" should prima facie establish a Totten trust, subject
to the rules of evidence and proof regarding a contrary intent
mentioned earlier. To add a variety of provisions on the card re-
garding right to control, etc., may result in the trust being held
tb be testamentary. On the other hand it is desirable, I believe,
that direct evidence of the Totten intent appear on the deposit card
as this may avoid a lawsuit after death. I would add the following
in readable size type:
It is the intent of the depositor, John Doe, to establish a "Totten"
trust. The depositor is to have full power to withdraw all or
part of the funds deposited at any time, and to revoke at any
time. On the death of the depositor, if the beneficiary be then
living, the bank is authorized to pay the balance in the the account
to such beneficiary, such beneficiary to then own the account
fully and absolutely.
In my opinion the Totten trust is the sort of development that
can best be worked out by the courts rather than by a state statute.
The courts can mold and shape and give life and adapt. However,
there is enough court history in other states for guidance, and so
it may be that a statute would be the safe way out for this state.
If there is to be a statute, I would suggest that the exact words of
section fifty-eight of the Restatement of Trusts be used.29
THOiMAS W. CHRISTOPHER*
Criminal Law-Confessions-Admissibility of Corroborative Evidence
I It is the general rule in the United States that a felony conviction
may not be based upon a naked extrajudicial confession of guilt, un-
corroborated by any other evidence.1 Most decisions concerning
" General references on Totten Trust: 1 ScoTT, TRUSTS § 58-58.5; 1
BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 47 (1951); Annots., 157 A.L.R. 925
(1945); 168 A.L.R. 1324 (1947).
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
'See, e.g., Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84'(1954); Pate v. State,
36 Ala. App. 688, 63 So. 2d 223 (1953); State v. Skinner, 132 Conn. 163,
43 A.2d 76 (1945). See generally Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde
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such corroborative evidence deal with the problem of the quantum
of evidence required to satisfy the rule. Another problem which
sometimes arises in this area involves the nature or quality of
evidence which may be used as corroboration of such confessions.
In the recent case of Wong Sun v. United States2 the United States
Supreme Court dealt with the question of the quality of evidence
used for corroboration in a case of first impression. The Court
held that the extrajudicial confession of one defendant could not be
used to corroborate a similar confession of a co-defendant.' The
Court held that the import of its previous decisions was that the
hearsay statements of an alleged co-conspirator were never ad-
missible against the accused, unless made during and in furtherance
the Defendant's Confession, 103 U. PA. L. Rrv. 638 (1955) and Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).371 U.S. 471 (1963).
The facts of the case were somewhat unusual. Federal narcotics agents,
acting on the tip of an informer of unknown reliability, went to the home of
petitioner Toy and, without benefit of a search or arrest warrant, broke in
and arrested him when he attempted to flee. Toy then admitted he had smoked
heroin with one Yee. At Yee's residence the agents found contraband
narcotics. Yee implicated Toy and petitioner Wong Sun, who each gave
the agents unsigned confessions implicating the other. The voluntary char-
acter of the confessions was not disputed. See Wong Sun v. United States,
288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961). Petitioners were tried by a federal judge and
convicted of violating the narcotics laws. The government's evidence con-
sisted solely of four items which were admitted over the objection that they
were fruits of unlawful arrests or searches: (1) the incriminating statement
by Toy when arrested; (2) the heroin found at Yee's residence; (3) Toy's
confession; (4) Wong Sun's confession. The Court of Appeals held that
the arrests were illegal but that these items were not "fruits" and were ad-
missible to corroborate the confessions; it affirmed the convictions. Wong
Sun v. United States, 288 F.2d 366 (9th Cir. 1961).
The Supreme Court held that the evidence other than Wong Sun's con-
fession was inadmissible against Toy as "fruits" of the illegality. The Court
held that the fourth amendment protected defendant against the overhearing
of verbal statements as well as against the more usual seizure of papers and
effects. 371 U.S. at 484-85. Stating that the settled principle of federal
criminal law was that a conviction must rest upon firmer ground than the
uncorroborated confession of the accused, the Court held that Wong Sun's
confession was inadmissible against Toy for any purpose; therefore, Toy's
conviction must be set aside for lack of evidence to corroborate his con-
fession. As to Wong Sun, the Court held that his confession was cor-
roborated by the seized heroin, since he had no standing to suppress it.
However, since the trial court had overruled his objection to the admission
of Toy's confession, the Court held that this confession may have been
erroneously considered admissible against Wong Sun. As a result, Wong
Sun was also given a new trial on the ground that in narcotics cases, where
evidence of possession alone is sufficient to convict, the required corrobora-
tion should be found among evidence properly admitted against the accused.
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of the conspiracy.4 Under this view, of course, a confession by one
defendant could never be used to corroborate the confession of a co-
defendant, since it would never be made during and in furtherance
of a conspiracy. The Court thus adopted a rather rigid exclusionary
rule in regard to the quality of such evidence, despite the fact that,
as to the quantum of evidence, it had taken a more permissive view.
In Smith v. United States5 the Court held that it was sufficient "if
the corroboration merely fortifies the truth of the confession, with-
out independently establishing the crime charged."6  The apparently
conflicting philosophies underlying these two rulings suggest that
the entire area may be in need of re-examination by the courts.
The rationale underlying the requirement that extrajudicial
confessions be corroborated seems to be based upon two factors,
which the courts often fail to distinguish.7 First, there is the
possibility that the confession, though voluntarily given, is false.
The accused might have been lying to establish an alibi, to obtain
leniency in the face of apparently overwhelming evidence of guilt,
or because of some delusion of guilt or psychological compulsion
to confess falsely.' Secondly, there is the possibility that a false
'The Court had previously held, in accordance with the general rule,
that a confession admitted against the confessor is incompetent as evidence
of the guilt of a co-defendant on a joint trial, and that the jury must be so
instructed. See, e.g., Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232 (1957);
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
-348 U.S. 147 (1954).
OId. at 156.
TThe Supreme Court has stated that the foundation of the rule "lies in
a long history of judicial experience with confessions and in the realization
that sound law enforcement requires police investigations which extend be-
yond the words of the accused. Confessions may be unreliable because they
are coerced or induced, and although separate doctrines exclude involuntary
confessions from consideration by the jury... further caution is warranted
because the accused may be unable to establish the involuntary nature of his
statements. Moreover, though a statement may not be 'involuntary' within
the meaning of this exclusionary rule, still its reliability may be suspect
if it is extracted from one who is under the pressure of a police investiga-
tion .... Finally, the experience of the courts, the police, and the medical
profession recounts a number of false confessions voluntarily made .... .
Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153 (1954).
In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 89-90 (1954), the Court pointed
out that "in our country the doubt persists that the zeal of the agencies of
prosecution to protect the peace, the self-interest of the accomplice, the
pnaliciousness of an enemy or the aberration or weakness of the accused
under the strain of suspicion may tinge or warp the facts of the con-
fession."
'Looking at confessions from this point of view, some courts have
concluded that they are inherently untrustworthy. Thus in State v. Long, 2
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confession might have been secured by means of physical or psycho-
logical duress, or even manufactured by the police. Dean Wigmore,
in attacking the corroboration requirement as an "exhibition of senti-
mentalism toward the guilty,"9 reasoned that a confession is properly
viewed in two aspects; that is, the confession as evidence should be
considered apart from the evidence establishing the existence and
content of the confession and its voluntary nature. He noted that
the conflict of opinion as to the value of confessions could largely
be explained by the fact that these ideas were confused. Wigmore
believed the voluntary confession to be evidence of the highest order
and discounted the danger of voluntary false confessions. He
pointed out that it was the evidence of the genuineness and volun-
tary nature of the confession which was properly open to suspicion,
and argued that the proper safeguard lay in exacting more testimony
as to the manner in which the confession was elicited.Y Instead of
a rigid rule requiring a set standard of corroboration which might
be capable of abuse by the guilty, Wigmore suggested that the better
procedure would be to receive all well-proved confessions in evi-
dence and to leave them to the jury, subject to all discrediting cir-
cumstances, to receive such weight as may seem proper. 1 If con-
sidered necessary the jury could be warned by court or counsel of the
possible dangers in such evidence.'"
Few American courts have been willing to accept the Wigmore
thesis. Judge Learned Hand, while reluctantly bowing to the fact
that the weight of authority required corroboration, questioned the
N.C. 455, 456 (1797), it was said that "a confession, from the very nature
of the thing, is a very doubtful species of evidence, and to be received with
great caution. It is hardly to be supposed that a man perfectly possessed
of himself would make a confession to take away his own life." A modern
case representative of this viewpoint is State v. Johnson, 95 Utah 572, 83
P.2d 1010 (1938). On the other hand, some courts have stated that a con-
fession is the highest kind of evidence. At one time this was the view of the
Supreme Court. See Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). Numerous cases
to like effect are collected in 3 WIGmoRn, EVIDENCE § 866 n.3 (3d ed. 1940)
[hereinafter cited as WIGMORn].
93 WGmoRE § 867.
103 WIGMORE § 866. A similar position was taken by Ruffin, C. J., in
State v. Cowan, 29 N.C. 239, 246 (1847): "Now few things happen seldomer
than that one in the possession of his understanding should of his own accord
make a confession against himself which is not true. Innocence or weak-
ness is therefore sufficiently guarded by the rule which excludes a confession
unduly obtained by hope or fear." Contrast this view with that taken in State
v. Long, 2 N.C. 455 (1797).
1 3 WIGMORE § 867.
" 7 WIGMORE § 2070.
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wisdom of the rule. "That the rule has in fact any substantial
necessity in justice, we are much disposed to doubt .... [I]t seems
to us that such evils as it corrects could be much more flexibly
treated by the judge at trial .... ,113 Despite such critics, the
corroboration rule appears to be inextricably imbedded in the Ameri-
can criminal law. Only a handful of American jurisdictions allow
a felony conviction to be based upon an uncorroborated extra-
judicial confession.14
While most courts are in agreement that some corroboration
is needed, they are divided on the question of how much extrinsic
evidence is required and to what issues in the case it must relate.
According to the overwhelming weight of authority, the evidence
must relate to and tend to establish the corpus delicti.15 The corpus
delicti under this rule includes only two of the elements of proof
needed to convict, that is, proof that some injury was done and
that it was done by a criminal agency; the third element, criminal
participation by the accused, may be proven by the confession
itself."0 A few American courts have rejected this rigid "corpus
delicti" formula and require only that some facts be proven outside
the confession which provide reasonable corroboration under the
circumstances.' 7 The English view seems even more flexible.
Generally the English courts require no corroboration of extra-
judicial confessions; however, in cases involving homicide, larceny,
3 Daeche v. United States, 250 Fed. 566, 571 (2d Cir. 1918). Professor
McCormick has taken a similar position opposing the inflexibility of the rule.
See McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 110 (1954).
1' See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kimball, 321 Mass. 290, 73 N.E.2d 468
(1947); Potman v. State, 259 Wis. 234, 47 N.W.2d 884 (1951). A few
states construe local statutes requiring corroboration as being inapplicable
to misdemeanors, and allow convictions of such offenses to be based upon
uncorroborated confessions. See, e.g., People v. Erickson, 171 Misc. 937, 13
N.Y.S.2d 997 (Magis. Ct. New York City 1939). North Carolina has
applied the corroboration rule to reverse a conviction in a misdemeanor case;
the court did not consider whether such cases should be distinguished from
felony cases. State v. Bass, 253 N.C. 318, 116 S.E.2d 772 (1960).
1 See, e.g., United States v. Markman, 193 F.2d 574 (2d Cir. 1952);
State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 185 P.2d 757 (1947); State v. Morgan, 157
La. 962, 103 So. 278 (1925). Some states have adopted the rule by statute.
See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 634.03 (1947). See generally Annot., 45
A.L.R.2d 1316 (1956).
1 See, e.g., State v. Benham, 58 Ariz. 129, 118 P.2d 91 (1941) ; Holland
v. State, 39 Fla. 178, 22 So. 298 (1897); State v. Morgan, 157 La. 962, '103
So. 278 (1925). But see Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954)
(corroborative evidence must implicate accused if no tangible corpus delicti).
17 See, e.g., Logue v. State, 198 Ga. 672, 32 S.E.2d 397 (1944); State
v. Cardwell, 90 Kan. 606, 135 Pac. 597 (1913).
1963]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
or bigamy, the trial court may either require independent corrobora-
tive evidence or warn the jury not to accept the truth of the con-
fession too readily.'8
In North Carolina the rule requiring corroboration of extra-
judicial confessions has undergone radical transformations. In the
early case of State v. Long 9 North Carolina seemed to be un-
questionably in accord with the general American rule requiring
corroboration. Yet in State v. Cowan20 Chief Justice Ruffin
equated a "fully proved" and voluntary extrajudicial confession
with a confession made in open court, and stated unequivocally that
such a confession "which goes to the whole case is plenary evidence
to the jury";" that is, an uncorroborated confession may itself
establish all the elements of the corpus delicti and thus support a
conviction. In 1954, in State v. Cope,22 the court reaffirmed the
earlier Long holding and again joined the majority in requiring
corroboration. However, in a dictum the court attempted to lay
down a rule to determine the quantum of corroborative evidence
required: "[I]t is our considered judgment that in such cases there
must be evidence aliunde the confession of sufficient probative
value to establish the fact that a crime of the character charged has
been committed."2  After this decision North Carolina was con-
sidered to be among those jurisdictions having a rather stringent
requirement as to the quantum of the extrinsic evidence.24 In the
recenil, case of State v. Whittemore,25 however, the court again
shifted its ground. State v. Cope 6 was construed as holding only
that a naked extrajudicial confession will not support a conviction
and the dictum quoted above was disapproved. Whittemore seems
to stand for the proposition that it is not required to have full, direct,
8 See generally MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 110 n.2 (1954) and 7 WIGMORE
§ 2070 and cases therein cited.12 N.C. 455 (1797):
2029 N.C. 239 (1847). The court did not mention State v. Long, supra
note 19, but instead relied upon English authorities.21 Id. at 246. This led some writers to conclude that North Carolina,
like Massachusetts, required no corroboration of extrajudicial confessions.
See, e.g., STANSBURY, NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 182 (1946); 23 N.C.L.
REV. 364 (1945).22240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
23 Id. at 247, 81 S.E.2d at 776 (1954).
2 See Note, Proof of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Con-
fession, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 638 (1955).
22255 N.C. 583, 122 S.E.2d 396 (1961).
' 240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
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and positive evidence of the corpus delicti independent of the con-
fession, so long as there are "such extrinsic corroborative circum-
stances, as will, when taken in connection with the confession,
establish the prisoner's guilt in the minds of the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. ' 7  This view of the sufficiency of the extrinsic
evidence seems to be in accord with the more permissive and
flexible minority view."8
Although it seems well established as a general rule in American
courts that extrajudicial confessions must have corroboration of
some sort, the question of the quality or competency of this evidence
has seldom been raised.2" The few cases which have dealt with the
problem of whether otherwise incompetent evidence is admissible for
the limited purpose of corroborating a confession are generally in
accord with the principal case in refusing to admit such evidence
for this purpose.8" North Carolina has taken a similar position.
In State v. Cope31 the court held that even though the pre-trial
statement of the state's witness was admissible to impeach her in-
consistent testimony, it was not admissible to corroborate the de-
fendant's extrajudicial confession. Since there was no other cor-
roborative evidence, the defendant's conviction was reversed.32 This
decision is an extension of the rule laid down in prior decisions that
27 255 N.C. at 589, 122 S.E.2d at 401.
28 See cases cited note 17 supra.
20 See generally 7 WIGMORE § 2071. Corroborative evidence may be
either direct or circumstantial. Allen v. State, 230 Miss. 740, 93 So. 2d 844
(1957). Testimony by the defendant or by an accomplice may suffice. See,
e.g., People v. Manske, 399 II. 176, 77 N.E.2d 164 (1948) (defendant's
testimony); Parsons v. State, 191 Ind. 194, 131 N.E. 381 (1921) (accom-
plice's testimony).
'0 See, e.g., Cohron v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 331, 242 S.W.2d 776 (1951);
Pepoon v. Commonwealth. 192 Va. 804, 66 S.E.2d 854 (1951). In State v.
Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 158 A.2d 11 (1960), the court said by way of dictum
that "It is . . . clear that admissions and confessions made by each de-
fendant may not be used to corroborate the admissions and confessions of
the others." 31 N.J. at 504, 158 A.2d at 19. But cf. State v. Knight, 19
Iowa 94 (1865) wherein the court stated that hearsay testimony as to state-
ments made after the offense by a confederate was admissible for the limited
purpose of corroborating defendant's extrajudicial confession; however, in
this case there was other corroborative evidence which was clearly ad-
missible and the court suggests that even if the admission of the hearsay
evidence was error, it was not prejudicial error. See generally Note, Proof
of the Corpus Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Confession., 103 U. PA. L.
REv. 638 (1955).
2240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954).
02 In a similar Tennessee case, the court reversed defendant's conviction
on the same ground, despite the fact that the court was entirely convinced of
his guilt. King v. State, 187 Tenn. 431, 215 S.W.2d 813 (1948).
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ordinarily inadmissible evidence admitted to corroborate or impeach
a witness may not be considered as substantive evidence against
the accused.33.
The problem of the admissibi lity of such corroborative evidence
had primarily arisen in regard to evidence barred by tle rule against
hearsay. For example, in the Wong Sun3 case, each defendant's
extrajudicial statement was barred by the hearsay rule as sub-
stantive proof of the guilt of his co-defendant, although competent
against himself under the "admissions" exception to the rule.30 It
could perhaps be plausibly argued that, since hearsay evidence is not
without probative value,36 the Court should have relaxed the strict
rules of evidence and allowed the two confessions to be mutually cor-
roborative.3 7  However, as the Court indicated, the circumstances
" See, e.g., State v. Neville, 51 N.C. 424 (1859) (prior inconsistent
statement admissible only to impeach witness); State v. Rogers, 233 N.C.
390, 64 S.E.2d 572 (1951) (prior consistent statements admissible only to
corroborate witness). Such corroborative extrajudicial statements can only
corroborate the witness who made them. State v. Lassiter, 191 N.C. 210,
131 S.E. 577 (1926). It might be thought that to admit such evidence to
impeach or corroborate a witness is necessarily to admit it against the
accused despite limiting instructions, since without this evidence the jury
might not believe the witness. See dissent by Judge Stacy in State v.
Davis, 229 N.C. 386, 50 S.E.2d 37 (1948). However, such evidence is
more trustworthy than ordinary hearsay, since here the person who made
the statement is subject to cross-examination. See Beaty v. United States,
203 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1953).
"Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
It might be argued that each defendant's confession should be com-
petent against the other under the "declaration against interest" exception
to the hearsay rule. However, this exception makes admissible only those
extrajudicial declarations of an unavailable declarant as to facts against his
pecuniary or proprietary interest. Thus a confession would not qualify since
the declarant usually is technically available, and the declaration is against
penal, riot pecuniary or proprietary interest. This view has been criticized
as unnecessarily restrictive. See MCCORMICI, EVIDENCE §255 (1954).
Under the almost universal rule, even a confession by another person that
he and not defendant committed the crime is barred by the hearsay rule.
Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913). In an eloquent dissent in
this case, Mr. justice Holmes argued that such confessions should be ad-
mitted as declarations against interest. 228 U.S. at 277-78. North Caro-
lina is in accord with the general rule that such evidence is inadmissible.
State v. English, 201 N.C. 295, 159 S.E. 318 (1931).
"The weight of authority seems to support the view that if hearsay is
admitted without objection, it is as strong as legally competent evidence.
See, e.g., Weil v. Free State Oil Co., 200 Md. 62, 87 A.2d 826 (1952);
White v. Newman, 10 Utah 2d 62, 348 P.2d 343 (1960). Such evidence
may be used to corroborate admissions of the accused. Smith v. State, 72
Fla. 263, 73 So. 188 (1916).
"' See Note, Proof of the Corps Delicti Aliunde the Defendant's Con-
fession, 103 U: PA. L. R!v. 638 (1955).
[Vol. 42
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of this case give rise to certain policy considerations which militate
against such a relaxation. What one participant says about his
partner in crime may be based on spite, fear, pique, desire to stand
well with the prosecution, or many other things not leading to
truth.3 8  Nevertheless, the Court goes further than the particular
circumstances of the case seem to warrant when it supports its
decision with the unexamined assumption that, since the hearsay rule
goes to the admissibility of the evidence, evidence barred by the
hearsay rule as substantive proof is ipso facto barred for corrobora-
tive purposes as well.39 The Court fails to consider the possibility
that it might be desirable to have different standards of admissi-
bility for ordinary substantive evidence and evidence merely cor-
roborative of a full confession of guilt.
Some of the principal difficulties in this area arise in cases in-
volving joint trials. The problem consists primarily of the neces-
sity of allowing evidence into the trial as to one defendant which
may be prejudicial to the interests of a co-defendant. Where there
is such a joint trial, the North Carolina court has followed the
majority, holding confessions of one defendant admissible where the
trial judge instructed the jury that such evidence could be used only
against the confessor." As the United States Supreme Court has
" Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy, 52 MIcH. L. REv. 1159, 1173 (1954).
Cf. WILLIAM S, PROOF OF GuILT 135 (2d ed. 1958): "The accomplice may
no longer have anything to fear or hope from the way in which he gives his
evidence; yet he may mistakenly entertain such a fear or hope, or he may
wish by his evidence against others to gratify some spite against them."
"371 U.S. at 491. A similar unexamined assumption is made by the
North Carolina court in State v. Cope,'240 N.C. 244, 81 S.E.2d 773 (1954),
discussed in text accompanying note 32 supra.
,0 The trial judge must instruct the jury that "the confession so offered
is admitted as evidence against the defendant who made it but is not evidence
and is not to be considered by the jury in any way in determining the
charges against his co-defendant(s)." Bobbitt, J., in State v. Kerley, 246
N.C. 157, 161, 97 S.E.2d 876, 879 (1957). (Emphasis added.)
North Carolina does allow the confession of a co-participant in the
crime to be used indirectly against another, where the other "adopts" such
a confession made in his presence; the rationale being that by adoption the
accused makes the confession his own. See, e.g., State v. vlurray, 216 N.C.
681, 6 S.E.2d 513 (1940). A few courts have held that a confession thus
made in the defendant's presence and not denied by him may be admitted
together with his adoptive conduct to corroborate his own confession. See,
e.g., Sutton v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 597, 269 S.W. 754 (1925). Contra,
State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P.2d 173 (1954). See also, United States
v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954). It has been held that a corroborated
admission by the accused may suffice to corroborate his confession. Smith
v. United States, 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
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pointed out, it is highly doubtful that a jury can perform such
mental legerdemain with any degree of success ;41 therefore, the only
truly satisfactory solution lies in granting a severance to the de-
fendant who would be unduly prejudiced. However, it has long
been held that this is a matter within the sound discretion of the
trial judge." Due to the crowded condition of most courts the
refusal of a motion for severance is seldom held an abuse of this
discretion.
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Smith
v. United States,4" the rule requiring extrinsic corroboration even
of admittedly voluntary confessions infringes on the province of the
trier of fact; consequently, "its application should be scrutinized
lest the restrictions it imposes surpass the dangers which gave rise
to them."44  It has been suggested that if the appellate court were
given the power of review on the facts and justice of the result
even if there be evidence to support the lower court decision, it
would lessen the urge to resort to such mechanical and inflexible
rules for reversing an unjust result. 5 It has also been suggested
that it would be more in accordance with the public interest to rule
that, where corroboration of the evidence for the prosecution would
otherwise be required, it shall be dispensed with if the accused does
not give evidence in his own defense.46 In regard to the admissi-
bility of the evidence required by the corroboration rule, the principal
case illustrates the difficulty often encountered in reconciling a strict
rule of evidence with the public interest that criminals should be
convicted. It seems clear that insofar as the corroboration rule
is concerned, the American courts have failed to achieve such a
reconciliation.
GEORGE M. BEASLEY, III
1The whole doctrine is severely criticized yet grudgingly followed in
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949).
"The difficulty in securing a severance in situations like that in the
principal case is shown by the recent case of State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489,
158 A.2d 11 (1960), which held that the trial court did not abuse his dis-
cretion in refusing to grant severance since (1) the confessions were not in
dispute as to the essential facts of the crime; (2) separate trials would
create difficult problems of administration; (3) the trial judge gave ample
instructions to the jury limiting the confessions to the respective confessor.
" 348 U.S. 147 (1954).
"lId. at 153.
See generally MCCORMicK, EVIDENCE § 75 (1954).
"See WILLIAMS, PROOF OF GUILT 140 (2d ed. 1958).
[(Vol. 42
